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Abstract 
Current executive compensation research posits a need to extend analysis beyond principal-
agent theory in order to explore the complex social influences and processes implicated in 
Remuneration Committee (RemCo) decision-making (e.g. Bender, 2007; Kakabadse et al, 
2006; Main et al., 2007), particularly given the current uproar surrounding reported levels 
and structuring of executive remuneration.  We respond to this international need by 
highlighting how innovative organizational learning theorizing can be integrated into further 
investigations of the remuneration ‘Black Box’, in order to focus attention upon the nuances 
of what and how organizational learning takes place in the remuneration process.  
Additionally, we note the importance of investigating the main actors and particularly their 
performance of complex roles within their rapidly evolving ‘social worlds’.  By exploring the 
organizational learning phenomena implicated in executive remuneration, we argue that 
practitioners, regulatory bodies etc. can appreciate further the implications of their 
respective decision-making.  Keywords:  executive remuneration, remuneration committees, 
organizational learning, social worlds. 
 
Transcending Principal Agent Theory to Unpack the Remuneration ‘Black Box’ 
The ‘Black Box’ metaphor has been employed in order to describe the remuneration 
(compensation) process and has triggered attempts to investigate this process empirically 
(Bruce et al, 2005; Main et al, 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  It is borrowed from 
cybernetics, indicating a set of processes of whom the workings are unknown, which Latour 
(1987) employs to conceptualize how certain phenomena (e.g. a particular piece of 
equipment, or fact that has been ‘established’) are treated as taken-for-granteds, at least until 
they appear to fail.  What emerges from recent remuneration investigations (Liu et al, 2010; 
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Ferri and Maber, 2008, Carter and Zamora, 2009) is that there are challenges to the 
established configuration of remuneration strategies, driven partly by the changing 
remuneration environment into which these strategies operate.  
 
Remuneration Committees (also known as Compensation Committees in the US) are 
expected and required to design firm-specific executive compensation strategies that align 
with corporate strategy, whilst nevertheless effectively incentivizing executives to take 
(responsible) value-enhancing actions.   The necessity of understanding the impact upon 
RemCo decision-making of such factors as shareholder activism can be seen in particular 
phenomena identified in extant corporate governance literature (Bender 2007; Spira and 
Bender, 2004).  Calls for more ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in corporate governance 
reflect how RemCos are under ever-increased scrutiny, yet research reveals how puzzling 
results emerge in the responses by remuneration decision-makers to their changing context.  
For example, extant research recognizes the ‘ratcheting up’ of remuneration packages in 
response to factors such as changing remuneration environments, or the fear of being 
perceived to drop too far below the median.  Clearly, the challenge for RemCos is that they 
are under pressure to ‘perform’ what is expected and required of them by their intra-
organizational stakeholders, such as the dynamic inter-relationships with executive directors 
(see Adams and Ferreira, 2007 and 2009), whilst under pressure from external bodies who 
have differing priorities (Walker Review, 2009).   The evolving nature of this situation means 
that the onus is on research to better understand how RemCos themselves are responding to 
these changes. 
 
Recent regulatory changes – for example, statutory disclosure rules on executive 
remuneration (Directors’ Remuneration Report regulations, 2002) or the advent of mandatory 
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adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) – complexify this 
situation along with increased shareholder activism internationally – triggered partly by the 
economic turmoil – manifested in voting down compensation packages (e.g. Royal Dutch 
Shell, BP, AMEC, GKS, and Bellway etc.).  Principal-agent based research suggests how 
RemCo decision-making is changing in response.  Studies into the introduction of IFRS in 
the UK, which represents a significant accounting regime change in that context post-2005, 
indicate that the primary impact of IFRS 2 (‘share-based payment’) is reflected in a shift from 
the use of stock options to performance stock awards at executive director level (Liu et al. 
2010)
i
.  Another example is the response towards the development of Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (DRR).  For instance, whilst differing in respect to 
the degree of its influence, both Ferri and Maber (2008) and Carter and Zamora (2009) agree 
RemCos are actively responding towards shareholders’ voting dissent.  They suggest 
RemCos increasingly take such dissent seriously, responding to specific shareholder requests 
by providing a stronger link between pay and performance, findings which can inform 
research in other countries going through similar regulatory changes.    
 
Given this evidence reflects changing shareholder attitudes towards what constitute RemCo’s 
‘acceptable’ and ‘expected’ remuneration strategies, there is a need to investigate the 
underlying rationales behind the process of RemCos’ decisions and responses of such 
changes.  It thereby supports the call by research world-wide to appreciate further the subtlety 
of remuneration decision-making (c.f. Bender, 2007; Kovacevic, 2009; McNulty et al, 2005) 
and the significance of the cognitive, behavioral and affective dimensions of RemCos and 
their associated actors.  This connects with Elkjaer’s (2004) Deweyian understanding of 
learning, whereby reflective thinking “begins when an uncertain situation is met and humans 
work to resolve this situation and apply thinking as an instrument in such a pursuit” (Elkjaer, 
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2004: 420).  Therefore, taking an organizational learning approach can complement the 
traditional accounting principal-agent theory explanations in exploring how remuneration 
decision-making is shaped.  It can throw further light onto developments the implications of 
calls for increased ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in setting of executive pay, thereby 
contributing to informed performance by RemCos, their immediate stakeholders and 
ultimately governance policy.   
 
The recent UK Walker Review (2009) further exemplifies a need for a better understanding 
of learning issues surrounding the roles of RemCos and non-executive directors (NEDs).  
Albeit focusing upon the financial sector, its discussions surrounding the role of RemCos and 
their members indicates the importance of organizational learning in the remuneration 
process and how governance may extend to other sectors.  It (Walker, 2009: 6-9) states that 
“Good corporate governance overall depends on the abilities and experience of individuals 
and the effectiveness of their collaboration in the expertise…The most critical need is for an 
environment in which effective challenge of the executive is expected and achieved in the 
boardroom before decisions are taken on major risk and strategic issues”.  Two important 
messages emerge from the review, firstly the management of dynamic relationships between 
RemCo and executive directors, as well as between RemCo and other stakeholders.  
Secondly, it highlights the appropriate balance of skills, experience (and independence) of 
RemCo members – what they ought to bring to the corporate governance process and what 
deficiencies must be addressed – placing a premium upon understanding how learning and 
development can contribute to improved performance.  Given the uproar surrounding 
perceived over generous bonuses, RemCos have to challenge their thinking around these 
established theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön, 1978).  In an unpredictable context, the key 
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decision makers in the executive compensation process (i.e. RemCos and their members) are 
increasingly required to justify their decisions and learn how to ‘perform’ in this context.    
 
In order to broaden investigate this executive compensation ‘Black Box’ (Pettigrew, 1992 
and Pye and Pettigrew, 2005), we employ an innovative conceptualization of organizational 
learning as ‘Social Worlds’, which synthesizes two streams of theorizing: ‘learning as 
acquisition’ and ‘learning as participation’ (Elkjaer, 2004).  This particular conceptualization 
recognizes that RemCos occupy complex relationships between actors, involving internal 
organizational systems as well as externally inspired regulatory frameworks
i
.  We do not 
assume that the presence of organizational learning indicates inherently positive outcomes – 
in which a RemCo’s will inevitably be able to attract and retain executive talent and align 
with the expectations of shareholders and/or organizational strategy, because this is a very 
complex task in practice. Nevertheless, we argue that an organizational learning 
understanding highlights the cognitive (as well as behavioral and affective) dimensions 
implicated in RemCo decision-making as its members grope towards such outcomes.  From 
this, we signpost ways for future organizational learning research to inform the remuneration 
process.  Thereby, we follow attempts elsewhere to draw from other Organizational 
Behavioral approaches – such as Bender’s (2007) use of motivation theory – to facilitate the 
shaping of remuneration decision-making by the (conflicting) expectations of the various 
stakeholders and their responses to perceived changes in their environment. 
 
The case for an Extended Organizational Learning perspective 
A number of remuneration researchers draw upon what has been described as the ‘learning as 
acquisition’ metaphor or a ‘learning as participation’ metaphor (Elkjaer, 2004; Huysman and 
Elkjaer, 2006).  For instance, Roberts (2001) highlights the importance of accountability as 
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key for ensuring that Board decision-making is optimized wherein “dialogue can reveal the 
incompleteness of individual thought, and create a synthesis of the interplay of individual 
differences” (Roberts, 2001: 1563).  Here he draws upon what Elkjaer (2004), drawing upon 
the work of Sfard (1998), describes as ‘learning as acquisition’ of particular dialogic skills, 
which focuses upon learning as the evolution and challenging of the shared mental models – 
such as reflected in the Learning Organization movement (c.f. Senge, 1992).  Alternatively, 
others begin to elucidate a different perspective.  For example, Kang and Tan’s (2008) social 
network perspective into voluntary ESO expensing by the US firms, suggests that decisions 
around whether to voluntarily expense ESO grants depends on boards of directors’ social 
learning and relational influences amongst interlocked organizations.  This begins to engage 
with what Elkjaer refers to as a ‘learning as participation’ metaphor, which is most obviously 
found in the ‘practice turn’ and the negotiation of realities within communities of practice 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991; Orlikowski, 2002), wherein ‘knowing’ is seen as a form of social 
realization implicated through distributed practices that can transcend traditional 
organizational boundaries (Gherardi, 1999: 111).   
 
However, Elkjaer (2004) demonstrates that synthesizing both the dialogic-focused and 
practice-focused approaches reveals those ‘social worlds’ in which actors contribute to their 
collective sense-making, because organizational learning “is a combination of skills and 
knowledge acquisition (product) and participation in communities of practice (process)” 
(Elkjaer, 2004: 429) and recently others have explored the connections between both product 
and process (e.g. Geiger, 2009; Saka-Helmhout, 2010).  Looking at the ‘social worlds’ of 
RemCos reveals how they are embedded within a network of relationships. They are charged 
with a set of decision-making duties; they have complex series of goals addressing 
simultaneously a number of stakeholders in order to persuade them that i) their decisions are 
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made on a ‘rational’ basis and that ii) they are performing in a ‘competent’ and ‘responsible’ 
manner; all within a fluxing remuneration context of regulatory changes, shareholder 
activism and uncertain economic climate.  Failure of RemCo members and associates to 
comprehend the implications of these factors could result in their failure to effectively 
provide the challenging role identified as vital for ensuring risk management in remuneration 
strategies (Bender and Spira, 2004; Walker, 2009). 
 
What do we mean by learning and how is it achieved? 
Reviewing extant corporate governance literature highlights the complexity of RemCos’ role 
and how their decision-making processes have to be better comprehended.  The importance 
of open dialogue, especially the facilitating role of both Chairmen and CEO has been 
established internationally (e.g. Kakabadse et al, 2006).  The impact of increasingly 
complicated accounting standards (e.g. compliance with IFRS 2) along with heightened 
stakeholder pressure within and beyond the organization – necessitates critical ‘higher level’ 
learning by RemCos (Argyris and Schön, 1978), because they challenge the extant routines 
that have emerged in what has been (especially in the UK) a ‘light touch’ regulatory culture 
(Main et al, 2007). 
 
This supports the ‘learning as acquisition’ focus upon developing synergistic dialogue 
through dispassionate inquiry into deeply held assumptions – to avoid pathological decision-
making (Burgoyne, 1995; Neck and Manz, 1994).  Roberts (2001) envisions critical dialogue 
as enabling RemCos to align compensation strategies with overall strategy and key 
stakeholder expectations. NEDs have to play a sensitive role here because “such open 
communication draws people into a deeper sense of their relatedness to each other” (Roberts, 
2001: 1554), as interactions between executive and NEDs are “a learning process in which 
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dialogue can reveal the incompleteness of individual thought, and create a synthesis of the 
interplay of individual differences” (Roberts, 2001: 1563).   Dialogue, Roberts argues, can be 
crucial because it has “the potential to contribute to strategic thinking and thereby make a 
more positive and extensive contribution to firm performance than that implied by agency 
theorists’ narrow conception of board monitoring and control” (Roberts, 2001: 1561-1562).  
This accent upon a Habermasian ‘communicative rationality’ has been applied elsewhere into 
boardroom decision-making (O’Donnell and O’Regan, 2006): investigating the implications 
of information clarity, access to timely information, etc.  It also links to recent calls for 
increased gender diversity in RemCos and at corporate level to provide a diversity of voices 
with differing opinions, thereby facilitating critical reflection to take place in the decision-
making process (Singh, 2007). 
 
Indeed, the ethos of recent regulatory recommendations mirrors such a belief in the idealism 
of transparent and open dialogue – connecting with the principal-agent worldview of the 
remuneration process.  In this way, the ‘product’ of organizational learning becomes skilled 
and knowledgeable NEDs who better comprehend their actions and become reflective 
practitioners (Elkjaer, 2004).  Indeed, organizational learning here is not merely pertaining to 
formal Training, but also informal or incidental learning (Antonacopolou, 2001; Watkins and 
Marsick, 2001).   
 
However, extant theorizing also reveals how the actors in the remuneration process have 
formal ‘roles’ codified through governance rules and recommendations as well as complex 
informal situated practices (e.g. Kakabadse et al, 2006; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  This 
connects with the ‘learning as participation’ perspective, which focuses upon the constant 
negotiation of meanings and how individuals (and teams) become encultured as part of this 
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negotiation (Brown and Duguid, 1994).  Here this metaphor allows us to consider the tacit 
knowing required, for example, to maintain RemCo cohesiveness, or to negotiate artfully 
with a main board and their consultants.   For instance Perkins and Hendry (2005: 1459) 
point out that RemCo members “are acutely aware of the principal-agency problems they 
have to negotiate but the ambiguities and weaknesses of their role, coupled with imperfect 
performance-reward data, do not allow for an easy or obviously satisfactory resolution of 
these.  The workings of a market in executive pay are fatally undermined by the social 
realities”.  Essentially, critics (e.g. Garratt, 2003; Higgs, 2003; Pass, 2006) argue that NEDs 
can find difficulties in participating fully – remaining instead on the periphery of the 
compensation process.  This is an area of concern, given the greater scrutiny given to the 
outcomes of RemCos decision-making. Here the notion of ‘legitimate peripheral 
participation’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2000) is useful to conceptualize the extent 
to which individual RemCo members are able to participate within the committee as a 
community of practice with other key actors, such as CEO and company secretary, who may 
be involved for part of the decision making process.  
 
However, we must be cognizant that both organizational learning approaches have well-
known deficiencies: particularly in their conceptualization of power relations.  Critics of the 
‘acquisition’ approaches warn of unrealistic assumptions of the power of dialogue: what 
scholars of rhetorical dialogue describe as a ‘strong form’ of dialogic rationalism (Myerson, 
1994).  Hence, whilst agreeing that dialogue can form an important dynamic in the 
remuneration process (Roberts, 2001), we also caution against assuming the inherent benefits 
of dialogue as an objective phenomenon whose mere presence automatically leads to 
improved performance.  Instead, as others have argued, dialogue can be understood as a 
subjective process of social constructing shared realities – whereby particularly influential 
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players can “reaffirm their intention to make rational progress towards a desired future, 
espousing certain socially accountable behavior” (Nicolini and Meznar, 1995: 741).  This is 
particularly significant given the confusing picture suggested by current research, which 
suggests that RemCos and other professions are still to fully understand and evaluate the 
impact of the new accounting standards (e.g. IFRS) and have yet to establish ‘shared realities’ 
about ‘socially accountable behavior’ in this changed regulatory environment.  Secondly, 
critics of the ‘participation’ metaphor denote the lack of clarity surrounding how learning 
emerges from the participation within the community, with similar concerns surrounding the 
power relations within these communities (e.g. Contu and Willmott, 2003; Huysman and 
Elkjaer, 2006; Roberts, 2006).   
 
In addition, as Roberts’ earlier description of the ‘sense of relatedness’ and dialogue suggests, 
appreciating the content of organizational learning needs to encompass not only the rational 
and cognitive, but also the affective.  Indeed, Vince and Saleem (2004), amongst others have 
noted, learning requires and is constituted by the affective as well, particularly as the 
presence of fear in organizational cultures can militate against a ‘reflective culture’ (Vince, 
2002).  Elkjaer (2004) highlights here the aesthetic dimension of the Deweynian 
conceptualization of experience, when inquiry is stimulated by unexpected events which 
disturb hitherto habitual actions.  She notes that this conceptualization of experience “stresses 
body, emotion and intuition as crucial parts of organizational learning” (Elkjaer, 2004: 429).  
Indeed, linking back to how power relations can be overlooked in the other two metaphors, 
she argues that the ‘social worlds’ metaphor “opens the eye to see that participation not only 
involves the strive for harmony but due to the focus upon the making of participation through 
commitment, it opens the vision for the emotional elements of organizational life and work – 
to tensions and conflicts reflected in the different commitments to organizational activities” 
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(Huysman and Elkjaer, 2006: 8).  This is pertinent to understanding RemCos and their 
experiences as they engage with difficult and taxing relationships with other stakeholders (c.f. 
Carter and Zamora, 2008; Ferri and Maber, 2009; Spira and Bender, 2004).   
 
Therefore, when we talk of ‘learning’ rather than merely describing an objective entity, a 
critical aspect of organizational learning is therefore who is participating in this process of 
reflective dialogue and how their actions and reactions influence this ‘flow of meaning’ 
(Isaacs, 1993).  What also leads on from this is understanding where we should look at 
learning taking place – significant when we consider the complex set of relationships 
between these actors that research has revealed in recent years (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997; 
Lincoln et al, 2006; Main et al, 2007; Pass 2006). 
 
Questions of Who and Where organizational learning Takes place 
Given the critical remarks made about the performance of RemCos in the light of the 
increased scrutiny placed upon the decisions that they make, critical questions arise as to who 
is implicated in this dialogic constructing of reality takes place?  Indeed, whom do we mean 
when we refer to the ‘performers’?  For instance, do we look simply at individual 
performance and possibly ignore the impact of collective relations?  Recent corporate 
governance research reveals a complex set of relationships between them and other actors 
(c.f. Main et al, 2007; Spira and Bender, 2004) – of which the following are an illustration:  
• The involvement of consultants (internal and external): their selection and 
independence of consultants – and when/ whether the latter meet privately with the 
RemCo.   
• The presence of HR/ Reward Director or Company secretary as adviser  
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• The advisory relationship of RemCos with shareholders (especially with 
institutional investors) 
• Changing senior management: particularly when new CEOs decide upon 
transformational changes of strategy, structure and culture. 
 
One focus could be upon the individual actor within the RemCo – because, as noted above, 
the ‘acquisition’ metaphor is associated with dialogic capabilities of members within groups, 
wherein the concept of ‘reflective practitioner’ and how managers can develop their reflective 
skills can be of benefit for improved decision-making (Schön, 1983).  Indeed, dialogic 
RemCo research focuses upon particular individual relationships, such as those within the 
Board (O’Donnell and Regan, 2006).  However, there is scope to extend this analysis across 
boundaries to incorporate collective extra-organizational collective stakeholders as well: 
especially given the evidence of escalating belligerence of institutional investors, as well as 
pressure groups purporting to represent shareholder concerns, which is impacting upon 
RemCo decision-making (c.f. Bender, 2007).   
 
There is also a need to appreciate what is involved for RemCos (and their members) when 
they actually perform their ‘roles’.  NEDs have been dismissed as ‘potted plantpots’, 
contradicting the idealistic vision of their role as encouraging and indulging in critical 
reflection (c.f. Froud et al, 2008).  Furthermore, empirical research reveals that the 
idiosyncratic nature of their roles.  For instance, when investigating different organizations in 
more detail, researchers find that (Kakabadse et al, 2006) there is not necessarily a consistent 
‘role set’ for Chairman, CEO, etc.  In addition, different remuneration regimes across the 
world can influence the nature of the relationship between RemCos and other actors (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) indicating the situated nature of performing 
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(Lave and Wenger, 2001) within the context of a particular board, influenced by specific 
national and cultural variations in cultures and governance structures.   
 
As Main et al. (2007: 7) emphasize, RemCos decision-making is multifarious – having to 
balance the incentivization of individual executives whilst ensuring that the latter deliver the 
organizational strategy, meaning that the RemCo “finds itself tasked with a prime 
responsibility of remedying or ameliorating the principal agent problem of incentive 
alignment for members of the top management team”.  This raises questions surrounding how 
the current RemCo actually perform these tasks and manage the expectations made by the 
other stakeholders.  Spira and Bender (2004) depict a very complex vision of the corporate 
governance roles that NEDs play: with overlapping membership of audit and remuneration 
committees creating potential tensions between strategic and monitoring roles, and the 
‘performance’ and ‘conformance’ aspects, which empirical evidence suggests is far more 
intertwined than previously thought (Main et al, 2007).  Ezzamel and Watson (1997) 
highlight how NEDs have to perform two differing roles as both supervisory and managing 
the remuneration packages. Others (e.g. McNulty et al, 2005) envisage a balance between 
external accountability (i.e. written representations of corporate conduct) versus internal 
accountability (i.e. the challenging dialogue through which NEDs ensure their own 
confidence in the corporation’s conduct) or what is described as NEDS providing ‘comfort 
generation’ (Spira, 2002).  This supports the need for a wider range of theoretical frameworks 
than simply principal-agent theory – to understand how actors such as NEDs perform 
complex multiple roles in the face of conflicting pressures with knowledge bounded by 
manifold expectations and agendas.   
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Noting above how the focus could be solely upon the individual’s reflective skills, an issue 
for research is to further investigate where RemCos and NEDs learn to perform.  Extant 
research has explored formal and informal relationships – such as in board induction (c.f. 
Long, 2008) suggesting that RemCos are situated within a complex network of relationships.  
Certainly, evidence from extant investigations of the role of RemCos indicates a need for 
establish how organizational learning transcends formal functional and organizational 
boundaries, emergent interest in inter-organizational learning provides a fruitful area of 
research.  For instance, in their exploration of inter-organizational networks, Swann and 
Scarborough (2005) point out how innovative learning comes from navigating those 
‘knowledge boundaries’ created by specialized practices: such inter-organizational learning 
being a vital resource for SME’s in manufacturing (e.g. Jones and MacPherson, 2006).  This 
could augment extant research into the complex social networks of NEDs, with their diverse 
membership ties (e.g. Kang and Tan, 2008), wherein NEDs often have multiple memberships 
on many boards, where they are exposed to different experiences, whilst also pressured to be 
seen to adhere to accepted ‘best practice’ by a RemCo’s diverse stakeholders (Bender, 2007). 
 
Consequently, we can envisage RemCos and members situated within a network of 
relationships, a complex array of relationships Main et al (2007) – perhaps more in keeping 
with the idea of a ‘constellation’ of communities of practice (c.f. Gherardi and Nicolini, 
2002), which can be exploited to provide opportunities for sharing knowledge and developing 
new Remuneration strategies.  Of course, these multi-faceted relationships involve trust – and 
political concerns are an integral part of collective learning in networks.  RemCos have a 
complex set of relationships to manage and what knowledge to conceal or reveal with other 
actors (e.g. the uneasy involvement of senior management in the compensation process).  
These are not challenges unique to the remuneration process.  In Biotechnology Research & 
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Development, the networked learning experiences can involve great tensions between 
collective and individual actors because of the need to balance the alignment of shared 
understandings, whilst being sensitive to the diverse interests and agendas of the key 
performers (c.f. Rowe and Smart, 2008, Swan and Scarborough, 2005).  These are issues of 
power and trust in relationships which challenge the customary harmonious description of 
communities in the ‘learning as participation’ approaches (Huysman and Elkjaer, 2006; 
Roberts, 2006) – or at least how this research has been somewhat ‘diluted’ in its 
popularization (c.f. Contu and Willmott, 2003).   
 
To address this lacuna we can explore the concept of ‘space’.  Boardroom dynamics research 
(Kakabadse et al, 2006: 143) emphasizes the vital role of Chairmen creating space “to draw 
to the surface the diversity of views, feelings and beliefs of each board member”.  However, 
the organizational learning theorizing alternatively extends the concept of ‘learning space’ to 
show how contested relationships can be a key dynamic of learning (c.f. Antonacopolou et al. 
(2006) and Rifkin and Fulop (1997).  This learning space is represented as a “window of 
opportunity” – whereby control is relaxed, enabling (at least temporarily) learning through 
staff are able to feel, think and question existing mindsets.  The relationships in this learning 
space are defined as much by subjective as physical boundaries wherein participants 
recognize and accommodate differences in interpretations such that “the unique thought 
worlds of different communities of knowing are made visible and accessible to others” 
(Boland & Tenkasi 1995: 359), harking back to ‘acquisition’ based organizational learning 
and their dialogic methodologies. However, the absence of such shared meanings can inhibit 
innovative learning so there is a premium placed upon meaning creation, how the participants 
make sense of themselves as performers as well as how they perform within their ‘social 
worlds’.  Indeed, from the social worlds perspective organizations themselves “are arenas of 
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coordinated collective actions in which social worlds emerge as a result of commitment to 
organizational activities” (Huysman and Elkjaer, 2006: 7).   
 
Consequently, whilst the ‘acquisition’ organizational learning approach allows a glimpse into 
the thinking of individual participants and the ‘participation’ focuses upon relationships in 
communities, the danger of using either approach singularly is to reify either the individual or 
the (harmonious) collective.  Alternatively, the social worlds approach focuses upon the 
emotional tensions, as well as the harmonies emerging from “the relation between individuals 
and organizations, the unit of analysis is not either the individual or the organization but a 
problematic situation or an organizational event” (Elkjaer, 2004: 427: Emphasis added).  
Drawing upon ideas from Dewey’s seminal work on experiential learning, Elkjaer (2004) 
places great emphasis upon understanding the contextual emergence of learning, in terms of 
the temporal (trajectory) and spatial (conditional matrix) considerations.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions: Signposts for Unpacking the ‘Social Worlds’ of RemCos 
In summary, the primary goal of this paper is to support the recent calls warning that over-
reliance upon particular theoretical frameworks (highlighting Principal-Agent theory) 
potentially inhibits future analysis.  Above all, it notes the importance of how research can 
engage explore the emergence of these ‘taken for granteds’ – taking into account bounded 
rationality and how the perceived ‘legitimacy’ of actions shape decision-making (e.g. Main et 
al, 2008) rather than the ‘rational’ optimization of packages that is a lacuna in the theory of 
‘principal and agent’ (Roberts, 2001).  Arguably practice is seemingly ahead of theorizing, 
for as Perkins and Hendry (2005: 1459) point out, directors in RemCos “are acutely aware of 
the principal-agent problems they have to negotiate but the ambiguities and weaknesses of 
their role, coupled with imperfect performance-reward data, do not allow for an easy or 
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obviously satisfactory resolution of these”.  Detailed discussions as to the solving of these 
ambiguities are beyond the scope of this paper, but certainly organizational learning 
theorizing is useful for engaging with how actors ‘artfully’ negotiate their roles. 
 
We adopt the concept of remuneration process as a ‘Black Box’ and how it is employed to 
cover issues surrounding the behavior of boards of directors (Perkins and Hendry, 2005; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).  However, we do not envisage it as merely a static 
entity waiting to be defined through a single research methodology, but reflective of a 
mysterious set of processes (Latour 1987) needing to be engaged with through different 
approaches.  This paper, by drawing upon the organizational learning metaphor of ‘Social 
Worlds’, has addressed some key issues surrounding RemCos and remuneration in order to 
signpost a possible route for further investigation of the learning processes surrounding how 
RemCos (and their members) make sense of their changing environment.   
 
Various factors that can trigger ‘critical inquiry’ (Elkjaer, 2004) in RemCos have been noted.   
Much has already been made elsewhere about concerns such as unexpectedly finding 
packages underwater or perilously below market median, as well as changes in personnel and 
corporate strategy (c.f. Bender, 2007; Kovacevic, 2009).  This paper particularly highlights 
how there have recently been further changes in regulatory environments (e.g. IFRS and 
DRR) because it places even more of a premium upon understanding how RemCos and their 
members learn to cope with this changing environment (Liu et al, 2010).   
 
However, investigations reveal that this pressure, rather than providing more objectivity and 
efficiency, can encourage unwelcome reactions – increasing the poaching of executive talent 
and pressurizing RemCos to ‘ratchet up’ the size and quality of their remuneration packages 
 19 
(c.f. Kovacevic, 2009).  Clearly, there is scope for future research that engages with why 
RemCos respond as they as they do: spotlighting the cognitive, as well as the behavioral and 
affective dimensions of organizational learning. 
 
The value of the dialogue-focused approaches from the ‘acquisition’ metaphor (e.g. Issacs, 
1993; Senge, 1992) is manifested in some remuneration literature’s focus upon developing 
critically reflective dialogue (O’Donnell and Regan, 2006).  However, as we noted above, 
merely identifying the presence of critical thinking – and especially presupposing positive 
outcomes from such dialogue – is to take a partial view of the complex political 
maneuverings of the various actors in the remuneration process.  Similarly, whilst the 
‘participation’ research is still very relevant for focusing upon the situated practices of 
RemCos and their members within wider communities, this can overlook the contentious side 
of such communities.   
 
Given the merits and demerits of both, this paper follows Elkjaer’s suggestion for a 
pragmatist view, which focuses upon the inquiry that arises from when habitual practice 
appears not to work and the through the re-configuration of these social worlds and the 
implications for establishing identities: individual, group and organizational.  Pragmatic 
theorizing shows how organizational learning research needs to look beyond static reified 
representations of groups, committees even communities; instead, to focus upon the social 
worlds of “collective actions and interactions shaped by individual commitment” (Elkjaer, 
2004: 428).  Learning is both an individual and collective enterprise – appreciating the 
diversity of ideas, meanings, power bases, etc. that influence and emerge from the action or 
inaction, commitment or withdrawal, from organizational processes, such as executive 
remuneration.   
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Addressing methodological issues, social worlds organizational learning research tends to 
favor more in-depth, qualitative methodologies (c.f. Huysman and Elkjaer, 2006); however, 
there is scope for more quantitative based research to trace through network associations 
(building upon such work as Kang and Tan, 2008).  Indeed, the term ‘Black Box’ could be 
extended to focus upon identifying specific actors (e.g. RemCos as actor-networks of intra 
and inter organizational relationships).  Because of space considerations, this particular paper 
limits the metaphor of Black Box to the remuneration process itself, we also acknowledge 
that there is scope for this theorizing to inform organizational learning research in this 
domain (c.f. Fox, 2000 for a further exploration of actor-network theory and organizational 
learning).  Nevertheless, above all, it is important that future research considers a range of 
methods in order to engage with the organizational learning complexities of RemCo decision-
making.  However, we argue that an organizational learning perspective does not replace, but 
augments not only the established Principal-agent based research but also other OB 
theorizing, such as motivation theory (Bender, 2007).  This position paper develops an 
argument that suggests that organizational learning theory can provide further insights into 
phenomena hinted at by principal-agent based research regarding how remuneration decision-
makers, especially RemCos, are grappling with the challenge of their changing environments.  
Significantly, we acknowledge how organizational learning theorizing is itself evolving and 
by drawing upon recent research used to address similar organizational learning challenges 
outside of remuneration research, we distinguish what and how organizational learning can 
be identified as well as where and upon who further research can focus.  This is in order to 
understand its implications for RemCos, their members and significant others and contribute 
towards more informed performance. 
Endnote: 
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i The European Commission issued the Regulation, EC No 1606/2002, on 19 July 2002 on the application of 
international accounting standards that require publicly listed firms in European Union (EU) member states to 
adopt IFRS in 2005, most of which previously applied domestic financial reporting standards.  In the UK, prior 
to 2005/07 no publicly listed firms in the main market/AIM voluntarily chose to adopt IFRS (Cuijpers and 
Buijink, 2005). 
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